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The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance
Richard Hynes, CoLLege of WiLLiam, and Mary, and
Eric A, Posner, University of Chicago

This survey of the law and eco nomi cs of co ns umer financ e di sc usses economic
mode ls of consum er lending and eva luates the major consumer finance laws in light
of them, We focu s on usury laws; restriction s on creditor remedies, such as the ban
on ex pansive security interests; bankruptcy law ; limitations on third-party defenses,
such as the holder-in-due-co urse doctrin e; information disclosure rules, including
the Truth in Lending Act; and antidi sc rimination law, We also discuss the e mpirical
literature,

1. Introduction
The law regulates consumer credit transactions much more heavily than
noncredit transactions like the cash sale of a computer. Nearly anyone can
sell computers to the public, but the creditor- bank, finance company,
pawnshop, credit card issuer- is heavily regulated by federal and state
agencies: licensed, in spected, and-less so now than in the recent pastcircumscribed by geographic, market, and product restrictions. I The comThanks to Peter Alces, Doug las Baird, George Triantis, and Todd Zywicki for their
helpful comments, and Steve Aase, Nick Patterson, and Scott Hesse ll for their valuable
research assistance, Posner thank s the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and the Lynde
and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for genero us finan cial support.
Send correspondence to: Richard Hynes, William & Mary Law School, PO, Box
8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795; E- mail: rmhyne@wm.edu.
I. A creditor may be an ordinary seller of goods, but to the ex ten t that the seller
o ffers the goods on credit, it is treated like any speciali zed creditor, and sellers of goods
often subcontract to such speciali sts,
©2002 American Law and Economics Association
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puter seller may offer any cash contract acceptable to the market, subject
to some li ght restrictions imposed by federal and state law. The creditor
may not choose a price that exceeds the relevant usury ceiling, or remedi al
terms that are considered too burdensome by the law. The computer se ller
is not required by law to explain what RAM is. The cred itor is required to
explain what a finance charge is and to present informati on about credit
terms in a stylized way that is supposed to ease compari son of the terms
offered by different companies.
In this survey of the law and economics of consumer finance, we
describe and eva luate the main patterns of consumer finance regulation
in the United States. We examine the state and federal laws that regulate consumer loans, including cash loans and loans that finance the purchase of real estate and consumer goods. We focu s on (I) price controls
(usury laws), (2), restrictions on creditor remedies, (3), bankruptcy law,
(4) limitati ons on the use of third-party defenses, (5), information di sclosure rules, and (6) antidiscrimination law. We do not di scuss general
doctrines of contract law that m'e applied to cash sales and credit transactions alike, including the unconscionability doctrine; statutes and regulati ons that ap ply to all consumer transactions, not just consumer credit
transactions, such as laws that regulate advertising or warranties ; and laws
that regulate the mm'ket as a whole, including licensing requirements for
2

creditors, geographic and activity restrictions, and antitrust laws.
The literature on the regulation of consumer credit is not as lively
as it once was. Academic interest peaked in the 1970s and em'ly 1980s,
and with the exception of work on consumer bankruptcy tailed off in
the 1990s. Yet consumer credit re mains a significant topic of public policy and a source of interesting and difficult questions. For poorly understood reasons, the individual bankruptcy filing rate has risen rapidly since
the 1970s, stimulating reform bill s in Congress and generating significant
attention in the media. The credit card industry has attracted a great deal
of criticism for its aggressive marketing efforts, confusing credit terms,
and high interest rates. Major retailers such as Sears are criticized for
their efforts to persuade customers to reaffirm debts in bankruptcy. And
controversy has swirled around the sale of credit insurance to low-income
2. We also do not discuss publi c choice approaches to the law or consumer Ilnance;
see, e.g., Boyes ( 1982), Buckley and Brinig ( 1996), Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison
( 1989), Lelsou ( 1995), and Posner ( 1997).
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borrowers, a practice that has generated considerable profits for creditors.
These and similar issues deserve more attention from scholars than they
have received.

2. Models of Consumer Lending
A. Lending in a Perfectly Competitive Market
An individual , Debtor, seeks to borrow money in order to smooth consumption over time. A firm , Creditor, otlers to lend money at a certain
rate of interest. tn a perfectly competitive market the interest rate will
retlect the time value of money, infl ation, and the ri sk of default. Debtor
accepts the offer if the benefit, that is, the transformation of future wealth
into current consumption, exceeds the interest rate.

/

[f Debtor defaults on the loan, he is legally required to pay Creditor.
If in fact Debtor does pay damages as a result of a lawsuit, or forfeits
collateral of sutiicient value, there is no "default" in an economic sense,
as Creditor is fully compensated . The problem for Creditor is that Debtor
may be judgment proof as a result of both legal and nonlegal factors. The
legal factors , to be di scussed more extensively below, include restrictions
on the ability of Creditor to seize assets or future income in order to satisfy
a judgment. Nonl egal factors include the difficulty of tracing Debtor if he
flees the jurisdiction or goes into hiding, and collecting from Debtor if he
simply does not ever earn enough money to pay otf the debt.
Default might occur in a bad state of the world in which Debtor
loses hi s job, hi s health, or a valuable asset. Risk-averse debtors want
insurance against slIch bad states, and in addition to the usual form s of
insurance, such as automobile and health, Debtor might purchase credit
insurance, which would repay his debt to Creditor if he underwent certain hardships, such as unemployment, illness, di sability, or destruction
of the collateral granted to Creditor. Debtor might al so obtain insurance
from Creditor itself in the form of a commitment from Creditor to forgive

mi ssed payments if certain events occur. 3 Nonrecourse loans also reflect
3. It is like ly that some lenders informally commit to forgive loans or at least
mi ssed payments through their reputations. For ex ampl e, Caplovitz ( 1967) describes a
practi ce of many credit se llers of abstaining from legal action after mi ssed payments
after using social networks to verify that the ir low -income consumers are un able to
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this interest in insurance. Debtor allows Creditor to seize certain collateral upon default, but Creditor g ives up the ri ght to seek repayment from
Debtor's other assets.
Consumer loans take many different form s. The basic elements are
the advance of cash (or goods) and the obligation to repay principal and
interest in installments or in the form of a single payment later in time.
Variations include open-end credit card transactions in which the debt can
be deferred upon the payment of a small amount and monthly accounts
at grocers and other loca l business. Consumer loans are often secured:
there are home equity loans, payday loans secured by the nex t paycheck,
pawnshop loans secured by pledged goods, loans secured by stock, and
so forth. Secured loan s may also be di sgui sed as other transactions, such
as conditional sales or leases.
4
A de bate has raged on and otf about why secured credit ex ists. Creditors should be indifferent in choosing between issuing a risky unsecured
loan with a hig h inte rest rate and a relatively safe secured loan with a
lower interest rate. Debtors should be indifferent in choosing between
an additional cl aim on their assets and a higher interest rate. Therefore,
because issuing secured rathe r than un secured credi t involves additional
administrative costs, secured credit should not ex ist. Two simple none1'ficiency ex planation s for the ex istence of secured cred it are that security
interests are used for transferring risk to tort and other nonadj usting unsecured creditors and that, in the consumer finance context, security interests
may be used to circumvent property exempti on laws (White, J 984). Efficie ncy ex plan ation s for secured credit are beyond the scope of thi s article,
although we note below where they are relevant to the law of consumer
finance.

B. Monopoly Power
Credit markets vary in their degree of concentration. Credit card and
mortgage lending are nati ona l markets involvi ng a large number of participants who are unlike ly to have much market power (DeMuth , 1986;
repay. A commit ment to forgive the loan upon the occu rrence of ce rtain events is
identi ca l to cred it in suran ce underwritten by Creditor.
4. For early arti c les presentin g most of the basic arguments, see Jackson and
Kronman ( 1979), and Schwartz ( 198 1), Scott (1977; 1979), Sm ith and Warner ( 1979).
For more recent treatment of the topic, see Bebchuck and Fried ( 1996), Hudson ( 1995),
or see Scott, et al. ( 1994).
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Elli ehausen and Wo lken , 1990; Pierce, 1991 ; S ulli van, 1984), but there
may be loca l monopolies in certain areas of the country, perhaps poor
ne ighborhoods, perhaps the res ult of regulations that rai se the cost of
entering the credit market. The ex istence of such concentrated credit markets, or the be lief that such markets ex ist, has inspi red much legal regulation.
In an environment with full or symmetric information, a creditor with
monopoly power will charge an interest rate that is higher than that avail able in a perfectly competitive market but will suppl y nearly the same
nonprice term s as a creditor in a perfectly competitive market (Schwartz,
1977). Harsh non pri ce terms are unattractive because consumers will pay
more for etli cient terms, and the creditor can use its mar ket power to
extract the surplus. The nonprice terms in the monopoli stic marke t will
not be identi cal to the nonprice terms in a competitive market-because
the monopoli st lend s less in equilibrium , the optimal terms of the contract may diner- but there is no reason to beli eve that the contract terms
in the monopoli zed market would be harsher than the contract terms in
the competitive market. And there is no reason to believe that forcing
monopoli sts to suppl y some of the terms that wou ld prevail in a competitive market wou ld produce a gain. Because the monopoly power remains,
further di stortions wou ld occur in the unregul ated terms (Schwartz, 1977).
Monopoly power can have other effects as well , but these require asymmetric information and thus will be discussed below.

C. Asymmetric Information: Debtor Ignorance
Even if there are numerous lenders in a market, each lender may have
some degree of market power because of the inability of consumers to
costl essly compare prices and terms. Depending on the source of the
information failure, this may result in either an ab normally high price
or abnormall y harsh terms. Some creditors wi ll lend only to those consumers who are unable to compare the (price or nonprice) terms of the
loan offered with the terms avai lable elsewhere in the market.
The problem req ui res that a large enough number of consumers find it
ditli cult to shop around. The competitive outcome would occur if a significant subset of the consumers became informed and if creditors were
unable to di scriminate between these debtors and uninformed debtors
by, for example, offering loans with different terms and interest rates
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(Schwartz and Wilde, 1979, 1983). That is, if enough consumers compare
loans before borrow ing, no lender can make a profit by lending only to
those who did not compare. in tension with this optimistic conclusion is
the insufficient incentive o n the part of debtors to shop around when doing
so confers a positive externality on the uninformed .
The creditor wou ld seem to have every incentive to di stingui sh itself
from its co mpetitors if it is able to offer credit on more attractive terms.
However, it cannot overcome consumer ignorance (possibly resulting from
mi sleading claims made by riva ls) when that ignorance is severe enough,
and the nonmonopoli st cred itor has insuffici ent incentive to educate consumers because of that creditor's inability to internalize all of the ga in
from that information. Thi s proble m is lessened somewhat if the creditor
has market power. However, a cred itor with market power may have an
incenti ve to provide too little information in order to aid in price discrimination (Beales, Craswell , and Salop, 198 1a). Furthermore, creditors will
have insufficient incentive to explain the economics of the cred it market
and the meaning of contract term s, because they cannot prevent people
who have benefi ted from the ir expl anations from seeking loans elsewhere
(Beales, Craswel l, and Salop, 198 1b).
It is possible for third parties, such as trade associations and independent groups like Consumers Union, to provide comparisons or standards
for comparison. However, each of these solutions has its own problems.
An independent group such as Consumers Union might supply too little
information because it would have difficulty preventing consumers from
sharing the information with others who do not pay Consumers Union for
it. Trade associations may have an incentive to create standards or report
information that favors those within the association over other competitors,
or, conversely, to avoid creating standards for fear of drawing the attention of antitrust regulators (Beales, Craswell, and Salop, 1981 b; Schwartz
and Wilde, 1977).

D. Asymmetric Information : Creditor Ignorance
A different information asym metry occurs when Debtor, rather than
Creditor, has private information. Debtor could have private information
about hi s Willingness to pay fo r credit, hi s propensity to defaul t, andafter the loan is advanced- the care with which he deals with financial
risk.
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Let us start with the case in which Debtor has pri vate information about
hi s willingness to pay fo r credi t. ff Credi tor has a monopoly, it has an
incenti ve to di scover Debtor's valuati on so that it can pri ce di scriminate . It
is poss ibl e th at C reditor can separate hi gher- and lower-valuati on debtors
by o ffe ring contracts with ineffi c ie nt terms. For example, C redi tor might
offer a loan with a hi gh interest rate and a loan w ith a coll ate ral requirement but a lower interest rate if thi s wo uld help it di stingui sh between
those who are partic ul arl y sensitive to the interest rate and those who are
not. T he effi ciency implicati o ns o f thi s practice are o bscure . So lo ng as the
monopo ly re mains intact, a law that prohibi ts the ineffi c ient term will both
elimi nate the cost assoc iated wi th the term and reduce va lue by interfe ring with price discri minat ion. Cred ito r will offer an average interest rate
that dri ves low -va lu ati on deb tors out o f the market (Craswe ll , 1995).
Another form o f informatio n asym metry occurs when Debtor knows
the probability o f defaul t and C reditor does not. Ass ume that, because
of personal characteri stics unobservable to credi tors, some debtors have a
high probabili ty of de faul t ("bad" debtors) and others have a low probability of defa ult ("good" debtors). Creditors that can disting ui sh debtors by
type obtain a competitive advantage, so a debto r's credi t record is valuable
information, but further investi gati on into the debto r's personal hi story is
not li ke ly to be cost justified, espec iall y fo r loans of small value . Fo r
thi s reason, cred itors mi ght try to flu sh out the ty pes by offering diffe rent sets of credi t te rms that ap peal to the diffe rent types. Harsh re medial
te rms are more costl y for bad debtors than for good de btors, because the
bad debto rs are more li kely to de faul t and thu s to become s ubject to the
terms. If credi tors believe that any debtor who fa il s to g rant a security
interest (or who fail s to ag ree to so me other harsh remedial term suc h as
a cognov it c lause) is a bad debtor, creditors may offer two contracts : a
secured loan with a low interest rate and an unsecured loan w ith a hi gh
interest rate.5 The good debtors e ffecti ve ly "s ig nal" their type by choosing
the secured loan with the low interest rate, whereas the bad debtors choose
the un secured loan. T he cred itors' beliefs are validated in thi s sepm·ating

5. Creditor might also be able to determine the type of the debtor th rough the size
or the loan requested (Frei xas and Laffont, 1990).
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equilibrium . Thi s wo uld be true regardl ess of whether the market is competiti ve or monopo li stic (Aghi on and Hermalin , 1990; Rea, 1984).6
A rule banning security inte rests and other harsh re medi al terms wo uld
be effi cie nt if the to ta l costs of the signaling exceed the total gains. If
the re is no c redit rati o ning and no effect o n the debtor's efforts to avo id
default (we di scuss both these assumpti ons below), the reduced in te rest
rate charged to the good debto rs sho uld be rou ghly offset by the increased
interest rate charged to the bad debto rs. In fact, it is possible that banning
suc h sig naling wo uld even be ne/it the good debtors. The reason is that the
good debtors mi ght pre fer a contrac t with no collateral and with an interest
rate that refl ected the average probabili ty of de fault in the popul atio n,
compared to a contract w ith co llate ral and a lower interest rate. In the
a bsence o f a legal ban o n security interests, Creditor would not offer the
e ffi cie nt pooling co ntract, because of its be lief in equilibrium that good
debtors issue security inte rests a nd bad debtors refu se to issue security
inte rests.
That sec urity inte rests and other consensual creditor re medi es can be
used to sig nal info rmatio n about debto rs does not necessarily mean that
they sho uld be banned, becau se this signaling may pl aya ro le in reducing a related probl e m caused by asy mmetric informatio n, credit rationing
(Be tser, 1985, 1987). C reditor sets the interest rate to refl ect the average
probability o f default in hi s po rtfo lio. Ass ume that good debtors are less
w illing to pay a highe r inte rest rate, because they are mo re likely to repay
the loan. 7 If C redito r canno t di sting ui sh amo ng debtors, the expected profi t
fro m a ny partic ul ar loa n will decline as the interest rate ri ses beyond some
point, becau se as the interest rate increases the good debto rs drop out
o f the market. The refore, credito rs (mo nopoli stic or competiti ve) will not
raise inte rest rates above this point, and credit w ill be ratio ned : the demand
by bad de bto rs for (even hi g h-interest) loans will be unmet (Stig litz and
We iss, 198 1). If there are too ma ny bad debtors in the marke t, their probability o f default is s utlic ie ntl y hi gh, and if the di vergence in the probability
G. If one imposes stronger assum pti ons, one can show that a monopoli st will behave
diffe rentl y than a lender in a competiti ve market. For exampl e, Besa nko and Thako r
(1 987) show th at under certain conditions a monopolist is more likely to prel'cr credit
rati oning over collateral.
7. The assulllPti on that the good debtors are more likely to drop out of the market
as the interes t rat e ri ses is standard , but not uni versal. For an arti cle assuming the
co ntrary, see Besan ko and Thakor (1987).
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of default is too large, the market unravel s, leaving only the bad debtors
willing to borrow but creditors unwilling to lend to them. This is the
phenomenon of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). Security interests and
related terms may reduce adverse selection by enabling the creditor to
distinguish among good and bad debtors. Security interests and similar
terms can serve as signals because they are cheaper for debtors who are
less likely to default.
Credit rationing can also resu lt if there is asymmetric information about
whether or not the debtor "can" repay a loan (Jaffee and Russell, 1976).
That is, debtors may have an incentive to claim destitution in order to
avoid repayment, and it may be difficult for creditors or courts to verify
this claim. In an extreme case, the only mechanism that the creditor may
use to force repayment is to deny future credit (Allen, 1983). Collateral
with personal value to the debtor and other forms of creditor remedies
ensure that a defaulting debtor cannot in fact repay if the debtor would
rather repay the loan than endure the "punishment" of repossession (Rea,
1984; Scott, 1989).
Another kind of asymmetric-information problem arises when Debtor
has private information about the care with which he avoids default.
"Care" can mean a lot of things: ( 1) working hard, so that he is not
fired and deprived of an income to repay the loan ; (2), protecting assets
or collateral so that they may be liquidated in case of default; (3), avoiding
physical risks that might result in injury; or (4) avoiding ri sky investments.
If Creditor cannot observe Debtor's level of care and penalize Debtor if
he takes insufficient care, and if Debtor does not expect to repay the debt
in full because of the legal and nonlegal factors mentioned above, then
Debtor will take a suboptimal level of care. This is the problem of moral
hazard.
One response to this moral hazard is to prohibit, by contract, behavior that increases risk. Many residential mortgage contracts, for example,
include a covenant against using the property for commercial purposes.
But this response really assumes away moral hazard by supposing that
conduct is observable: when conduct is unobservable, it cannot be prohibited by contract. The second response to moral hazard is to require Debtor
to bear some of the cost of default, thus converting a debtor who might
otherwise be fully judgment-proof into one who is partly judgment-proof.
For example, requiring that personally valuable property be collateral
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reduces the probability that Debtor will be able to protect it at the time
of default through judic ial process. Alternatively, Creditor might seek to
destroy Debtor's reputation by publicizing the default; to cause psychic
harm by liquidating a guarantee from a loved one; or, in the case of loan
sharks, to break bones. Even though these actions provide no direct benefits to Creditor while conferring costs on Debtor, they may be efficient
because they reduce moral hazard (Rea, 1984).

3. Law
A. Price Restrictions: Usury Laws
Description. Every state has laws restricting the interest rate that can be
charged for consumer loans; a sample of these restricti ons is set forth in
Tabl e I. However, although the interest rate ceilings in some states are
quite low, their effect on the credit market is likely to be limited. There
are many reasons for thi s. First, federal law preempts state usury laws in
a variety of cases, the most important being home equity loans, for which
there is no federal interest rate ceiling. 8 Further, since the late I970s, federal law has permitted federally insured state institutions to "export" the
hi gh interest rate ceilings of the states in which they are located , permitting them to lend at high interest rates to debtors who reside in states with
low ceilings (Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Servo
Corp.). Second, state usury ceilings have long been riddled with exceptions for, among other things , small loans, retail installment loans, and
loans issued by favored institution s like credit unions. Third, interest rate
ceilings often understate their effective limits, the result of special rules
for calculating interest rates when lenders compound, charge fees , give
di scounts, and calculate balances in different ways. Fourth, remedies for
violation of usury laws are frequently narrow (Alperin and Chase, 1986).
Fifth, usury ceilings may be evaded in many ways-for example, by disguising interest as part of the "price" of the good if sold on credit with a
di scount for cash transactions, or by disguising a secured transaction as a
lease with high rental payments and a low buy-out price (Peterson, 1983).
Sixth, many usury ceilings are set at fixed interest rates, thereby lessening
8. This was actually an incomplete preemption as the states were give n the ri ght
;;opt out" and 14 states did so (A lperin and Chase 1986).

to
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Table 1. Res tricti o ns o n Consume r Loan Contracts and Re medi es for Default

State
A labama
A laska
A ri zona
A rkansas
California
Colorado
Connecti cut
Delaware
Florida

USlII'y Lim it on
Contnlct Loans
(Unsecured $lO,()()O)
No limil
FRDR " + 5%
No li mit
FRDR + 5%
10%
45%
12%
FRDR + 5%
18%
No limit
12%
No limit
No li mit
2 1%

Homestead
Exemption

5,000
64,SOO
100,000
SOO (P' )
50,000
45,000
75,000 (F)
5,000"
No limil'
Georgia
5,000
H awa ii
20,000 (F)
Idaho
50,000
Illi nois
7,500
Indiana
7,500
Iowa
U.S. bond s + 2 point s
No li mit
Ka nsas
15%
No limit
Kentucky
Lesser of 19% or FRDR + 4%
5,000
Loui siana
12%
25 ,000
Ma ine
18%
12,5 00
Maryland
S%
5,500
Massachu scl1 S No li mit
100,000 (F)
Mi chi gan
7%
3,500 (F)
Minnesota
No limit
200,000 (F)
Mi ss issippi
Hi gher 01' 10% or FRDR + 5% 75,000
M issouri
Hi gher o f 10 % or U.S.
S,OOO
bond s + 3 points
Montana
No li mit
100,000
Nebraska
16%
12,500
Nevada
No li mit
125 ,000
New Hampshire No limit
30,000 (F)
New .J ersey
16%
o (F)
New M ex ico
No limit
30,000 (F)
New York
16%
10,000
North Carolin a Hi gher of 16% or T-bill
10,000
rale + 6%
North Da kota
l : bill rate + 5.5%, max.
80,000
not less than 7'Yo
Ohi o
8%
5,000
Ok lahoma
18%
No li mit
Oregon
No limit
25,000
Penn sy l vania
No limit
o (F)
Rhode Island
Hi gher or 2 1% or T-bil l
o (F)
rate + 9%

Gal'nishment"

Tenancy
by the
Entirety

$420/wk

75%/40 x FMW
85 %
$ 500/w k

X
X

A t least 80%

X

85 %/45 x FMW

X
Varies by income

P

X

X
7 5%/40 x FMW
90%

X

85 %
P
90%/set by judge
7 5%/40 x FMW
90%
P

X

75 %/40 x FMW

p

X
X
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Table 1. Continued
Usury Limit on
Contract Loans
(Unsecured $10,000)

State

Homestead
Exemption

Garnishment'

5,000 (F)
South Carolina 8.75'70
No limit
South Dakota No lim it
Lesser or Prime Rate + 4 pts.
Tennessee
5,000
or 24%
No li mit (F)
2 x T-bi II fur fi xed rate/
Texas
18%- 24% 1'01' variable
No limit
20.000
Utah
75 ,000 (F)
12%
Vermont
Vi rginia

12%

Washi ngton

Higher or 12% or T-bill
rate + 4%

West Virginia
Wisconsin

18%
12%

40,000
15,000
40,000

Wyoming

2 1%

10,000

P
p

p

X
X

5,000

regular,
6% compounding

Tenancy
by the
Entirety

(F)
80%/30

x FMW

(F)
X

Note : Thi s la blt.! is inh!ndc.! u to convey a rough se ils\.! of lilt.! variation amo ng slates: all Ihe figures an.::

subj ec t 10 co nditi ons that can hI.! found ill statut1!S and judicial lk:cisions.
i.I

Fcdl.!r~t1 law limits garni shment so th at th e.! deh tor wi ll be able

and 30

lilllt.!S

10

kcc.::p the g reall.! f of 75% of his t.!'lrni ngs

lhl! minimum wage. Stale law is morl! rt.!slricli vl! wht.!n!

1l 01l!u:

thl.! pt.! n:l!lltage il nd dollar limits

refer 10 Ihl.! amount thaI the tk:bt or is cllIitlcd to keep. Whc.: n; tht.!rt! is a slash th l.! debtor is eJ1lith.::d [() kt.!(:p
the llla ximulll of Iht.! two ligurt.!s, and

II

x FMW Illeans

that ga rni shnwnt is prohibited without til t: debtor's

II

tillll:s th e ft.!d(: ral minimulll wage. "P" indicates

CO Il S(: 1l1.

b "FRD R" Jllt.!ans Fl:dcra l Res(:l' vt.! Discount Rat t!.
"F" meilns tha t thl.! slate perm its the use of the federa l cx..::mptions in bankruptcy, 13 U.S.C. 522(d):

C

$ 16, 150 for th o hOllles tead as o f Jalluary I, 200 1

d The fi g ur..:: r(: j'..:: rs 10 the wildcard (:xl:lllption . whi ch c<tn bt: app lk:d to any kind of pro perty.
e "No limit" means that th el\! is not a mo netary limit on Ihl.! value or tht! reid l!stale that ma y be exe mpted:
til!!!'t.!

Illil y

bl.! other limits. inc ludin g lolal acr..::age .

thei r importance in periods of low inflation. Sti ll , usury ceilings have theOI'etical interest and hi storical sign ificance, and they continue to influence
many ordinary lending practices.
Usury laws are simply price controls and can be predicted to
have many of the same effects: queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an ill egal market, loansharking. Unli ke standard price controls, however, it is
doubtfu l that usury laws lower the price of a loan, the interest rate, paid
Effects.

by any parti cu lar borrower. Because there are many alternative uses of
capital , a ceiling on interest rates wi ll simply lead cred ito rs to refu se to
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lend to hi gh-risk debtors and instead lend to lower-ri sk debtors at legal
rates or to seek other investment options. To the extent that hi gh interest rates are the result of market power enj oyed by lenders, as a result
of either monopoly power or search costs (Ordover and Wei ss, 1981),
usury laws mi ght be able to lower the rate charged to borrowers. But state
and fed eral regulatory agencies di scourage excess ive concentration in the
banking industry, and many consumer loan markets are now natio nal in
scope. [n additi on, there is li ttle ev idence that consumers lack information about interest rates, espec iall y after the implementation of the Truth in
Lending Act descri bed below (Schwartz and Wilde, J 979). Even if lenders
did have some monopoly power and the usury ceiling reduced the rates
paid by some debtors, these ceilings would cause hi gher-ri sk debtors to
be deni ed cred it because cred itors would be unable to charge them higher
rates, thus offsetti ng much, if not all , of the welfare gain.
Ausubel ( 199 1) raises the poss ibility that interest rates o n cred it cards
are artificially hi gh becau se of the irrationality of consumers. He arg ues
that low-ri sk cred it card users intend never to borrow and therefore do
not consider the interest rate when choos ing among credit cards, whereas
hi gh-risk credit card users do con sider the inte rest rate. Because creditors
cannot di stinguish between low-ri sk and hi gh-ri sk debtors, no creditor
would lower its interest rate, because it would di sproportionately attract
hi gh-ri sk debtors. A limit on interest rates could therefore be welfare
improving. However, Ausubel's thesi s is in tension with recent studies
that have found that consumers are sensitive to interest rates (Gross and
Sou leles, 2000) 9
Some of the earl y empirical literature on usury did find that states with
usury laws had lower average interest rates than states without them. lo But
most of the literature found that usury laws result in a significant reduction
in the access to credit for hi gh-risk debtors. I I ]n fact, Villegas (1982, 1989)

9. For a recent discussion of thi s controversy, see Zywicki (2000).
10. See, fo r example, Greer ( 1973), Peterson ( 1979), Peterson and G insbe rg ( 1981),
Shay ( 1973), and Wolkin and Navralil ( 1981).
II. See, for exa mpl e, Boyes and Roberts ( 198 1), Dunkel berg and DeMagistris
( 1979), Greer ( 1975), Kawaja ( 1969), and Shay (1970). For studies findin g no credit
rati on in g, see Eisenbeis and Murphy ( 1974), Goudzwaard ( 1968, 1969), and Pete rson
( 1983). This is cons istent with studies of the mortgage credit market, which typically
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find s that the entire decline in the average interest rate is attributable to the
exclusion of these debtors fro m the market; the usur y laws do not reduce
the interest rate paid by any individual debtor. This result is unsurprising:
the suppl y of loans should not be ine lastic if capital can be used for
other projects or in other jurisdictio ns. The only surprising thing about
these findin gs is that, because usury laws are so easy to circumvent, it is
di ffi cult to beli eve that they have any impact on behavior.
Usury laws have a long and significant hi story, are still important
in many jurisdi cti ons, especiall y Islamic countries, and continue to resonate with the moral intuitions of many people. This has led schol ars to
suggest possible beni gn expl anations for their popularity. First, a usury
law may be a crude form of soc ial insurance in a jurisdiction that has
poorl y developed capital markets closed to the outside world and an ineffi cient or nonex istent welfa re system (Gl aeser and Scheinkman, 1998).
If usury ceilings depressed the pri ce of credit, the poor would be able
to borrow more cheaply, and thi s might be effici ent if the poor have
a suffi ciently hi gher marginal utility of money than the rich. From an
ex ante perspective, an individual benefi ts from usury laws if his lower
return when he has capital to spare in some future state of the world
is offset by hi s lower borrow ing costs when he needs to borrow in
some alternative future state of the world. This argument is inconsistent with the mobility of modern capital, and so has no application to
modern conditions; significantl y, usury laws have been repealed in every
industri ali zed nati on except the U.S., Belgium, and France (Alperin and
Chase, 1986), though a fairly restrictive usury law was enacted in Italy
in 1996.
Second, welfare laws create a moral hazard, and usury laws may therefore be needed precisely because they restrict access to credit. Because
welfare laws reduce the consequences of default for the debtor by providing him with a minimum standard of living after his creditor employs
all available re medies, the debtor will be willing to borrow to undertake

find that restri ctions on usury reduce the number of building permits, due to a reduction in home fi nancing. See Austin and Lindsley ( 1976), Boyes and Roberts ( 198 1),
Crafton ( 1980), Ostas (1 976) and Robins ( 1974). But see McNulty ( 1980) and Rolnick,
Graham, and Dahl ( 1975), who fi nd no significant effect on building permits but find
a significant effect e ither on nonpri ce terms or on loan vo lume.
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ri skier ventures (Posner, 1995).1 2 Usury ceilings prevent these high-ri sk
loans and therefore reduce the negative consequences of the moral hazard . Thi s argument assumes that peopl e benefit from welfare laws, and,
unlike the first argument, that an e ffecti ve welfare system is in place.
There is littl e stati sti cal evidence for these theories; they are intended
to rationalize hi storical practice.

B. Restriction s on Creditor Remedies
Description. A confusing array of federal and state laws restrict the tools
that creditors have traditionally used to force repayment, including the
reporting of past consumer behavior and nonl egal mechanisms, such as
contacting the debtor and third parti es to request repayment. I] Self-help
can be effective: debtors repay loans in order to avoid unpleasant phone
call s; threatening letters; humiliation in front of friends, employers, and
family members ; and damage to their cred it reputation s. 14 The Fair Debt
Co llect ion Practi ces Act requires certain kinds of creditors to (1) verify
the debt if the consumer challenges it; (2), refrain from threats and harassment; (3) , refrain from publi shing the names of de faultin g debtors; and (4)
refrain from mi srepresentati on of their legal rights, the consequences of
nonpayment, and so forth (Alperin and Chase, 1986). Although the federal act does not directly apply to the cred itor that originated the loan ,
its restrictions may apply to the creditor's lawyers (Heintz v. Jenkins). In
addition , some states app ly similar regulations to the original creditors as
wel l. Accordingly, we di scuss these rules in thi s section rather than in the
section, below, on third-party defenses .
When se lf-help fail s, creditors often sue and obtain repayment through
prejudgment ancl postjudgment remecli es . Before judg ment a creditor may
12. A related argument pusits that usury laws prevent low-income debtors with a
hi gh discuunt rate from burrowing aga inst future welfare pay ments and that this credit
rati onin g permits a society co mmitted tu providing a minimum per-peri od welfare to
do so al a lowe r cost (Avio, 1973).
13. The Fai r Credit Reporting Act limits the reporting of bankruptcies by consumcr report ing agencies to ten years and limits the reporting of most other adverse
informati on to seve n years.
14. For exa mple, early in the modern history of co nsum er credit, "small lenders
relied un the profess ional services of th e 'bawlerout,' a female employee who was
ass igned the job of trappin g the delinquent borrower before co-workers and famil y in
oreler to brow beat him publicly for being a sorry deadbeat" (Calder, 1999). See also
Rca (1 984).
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be abl e to obtain a li en on the debtor's assets and to garni sh the debtor's
wages, and these powers are usually suffic ient to obtain repay ment. However, prejudg me nt attac hment and garnishment are now regulated in various ways by the state and federal governments; they are also subject
to constitutional due process limitati ons. Garni shment, both prejudgment
and postjudgment, is heav ily restricted by federal law (roughl y to 25% of
wages, but with many excepti ons), and some states have even more restrictive limits or prohibi t ga rni shme nt altogether. There are fewer restrictions
on postjudgment re medi es; these usuall y involve the sheriff's seizing and
aucti oning o ff property, or (again) garni shment of wages, which remains
heav il y restri cted even as a postjudg ment remedy. Postjudgment seizure of
property is signi fica ntl y curtailed by state (and federal) exemption laws,
whi ch limit the kind and amount o f property (home equity, clothing, furniture, pensio ns, and so forth) that can be seized in order to satisfy unpaid
debts. A sample of pro perty exemptions and garni shment limitations is
provided in Tabl e I .
A creditor can improve its ability to collect by barga ining in advance
for certain ri ghts. For exampl e, a cognovi t note, in which the debtor essenti all y binds himself to confess judgment if he defaults, rel ieves the creditor of the troubl e of prov ing its case in court. However, cognov it notes
are ill egal in many contex ts (A lperin and Chase, 1986). By obtaining a
security interest a creditor ga ins priority over unsecured creditors and, if
the security interest is perfected, over creditors with later-in-time security
interests in the same property. Because a secured creditor can seize much
of the property that would otherwi se be exempt under state or federal law,
debtors and creditors can use security interests to e ffect ively waive many
of the exempti ons. In addition, the security interest may also all ow the
creditor to skip some o f the steps in the judicial process, and even sk ip
it altogether if the creditor can repossess the collateral without breaching
the peace. At one time, creditors would obtain security interests in all the
debtor's househo ld goods, even those that were not purchased from the
creditors or w ith the credito rs' mo ney.
Today, however, secured consumer credit is heavil y regul ated. I S FTC
regulati ons and so me state laws fo rbid creditors to obtain nonpossessory
15. Cred itors may seek to avo id Illuch of thi s regulati on and potenti all y adverse
bankruptcy treatment by recharactcri zing the transacti on as a lease or a rent -to-ow n
transacti oll.
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nonpurchase money security interests in household goods, although there
are some exceptions. The bankruptcy code also permits debtors to nullify
nonpurchase money lie ns on many of these same household goods. Some
states provide the debtor a rig ht to redeem the collateral for up to a year,
even if the collateral has bee n so ld to a third party, and require the creditor to obtain a court judgme nt before repossess ing collateral. Finally, a
foreclosure on collateral wil l sometimes preclude the creditor from seeking the remainder of the amount owed through a defi cie ncy judgment.
Common law and state statutory rules granting a ri ght of redemption and
prohibiting defic iency judgme nts are important forms of regulation of the
home mortgage market.
Many of these restri ctions are available in bankruptcy, but we discuss
bankruptcy separately, below.

EfFects.

Critics argue that the strong contractual rights to repossess consumer goods are ineffici e nt because the repossessed property has minimal
resale value for the cred itor but considerabl e personal value for the debtor;
these remed ies are used in order to coerce (Leff, 1970; Whitford , 1986).
Although there is some ev ide nce that fire sales ex ist (assets are sometimes
solei for less than their wholesale book value), other schol ars argue that
the perception that val ue is lost is based on a misunderstanding of the
operation of markets: 16 It is unlikely that value would be destroyed, given
the characteristics of the debtors and creditors and the abil ity to renegotiate (Schwartz, 1983) and so long as creditors believe that a reputation for
aggressive collecti on techniques might scare off debtors (Peterson, 1986).
As we saw above, however, even collection mechani sms that are inefficient
at the time of collection may be efficient ex ante precisely because they
are "coercive." They can, in theory, reduce moral hazard by increasing the
cost to the debtor from defaulting (Rea, 1984) and adverse selection by
enabling the creditor to di stinguish among debtors by ri sk level (Bester,
1985). (See generally Epstein , 1975; Scott, 1989.) Regardless, the restrictions on creditor collections generate costs for creditors, and creditors
should pass these costs on to debtors in the form of higher interest rates or
16. See Schuchman ( 1969), White ( 1982), Note ( 197 1), and Note ( 1975). Grau and
Whitford ( 1978) show that. repossessions declined after Wi sconsin enacted a statute
that requ ired creditors to obtain a judgment before seizing coll ateral from a defaulting
debtor. This result is entirely predictable, and , as they appear to acknowledge, they do
not show that debtors are made better off by the law in an ex ante sense.
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else deny access to credit, particularly for high ri sk debtors. Restri ctions
on coerc ive creditor remedies in general, and exemption s in particular, are
associated w ith hi gher interest rates and increased probabilities of denial
of cred it. 17 The effects are more pronounced for low-income or low-asset
debtors. 18
As noted, exemptions do not directly affect the suppl y of secured credit,
becau se creditors can obtain security interests in exempt assets and foreclose o n them if the debtor defaults . However, exemptions could indirectly
affect the suppl y of secured credit, in either of two directions. On the one
hand, because the value of exemptions is enhanced in bankruptcy as a
result of lien waiver provisions and similar laws, more valuable exemptions might lead to more bankruptcies. As the automatic stay and other
bankruptcy rules interfere with security interests, more generous exemptions could lead to less secured credit. On the other hand, these added
bankruptcies or general defaults may make costly foreclosures less likely
because the debtors are in a better position to make the payments on their
secured loans out of future income after having the unsecured loans di scharged. The empirical ev idence is mixed. Although Berkowitz and Hynes
( 1999) find a very small decrease in the rate of denial s and the interest
rate on home mortgage loans in the face of larger homestead exemptions,
Lin and White (200 I) found an increase in these vari ables. Regardless, to
the extent that the exemptions inc rease the use of secured credit relative
to unsecured cred it, the parties mu st go through the formality of obtainin g a security interest in order to make assets available for coll ection in
case of defau lt, and that is an added cost.
Limitations on cred itor remedies do provide some benefits to the debtor.
These limits provide some in surance by protecting the debtor's income and
17. See, for example, Barth, Gotlil', Manage, and Yezer ( 1983) and Greer ( 1974).
See Gropp, Scholz, and White ( 1997) (examining the effect of the exempti ons on
credit markets gene rally) and Berkowitz and White (2000) (ex amining the effects of
the exe mpti ons on the market for small bus iness loans). We note that Gropp, Schol l.,
and White ( 1997) use the same data set used by Villegas ( 1990) to investi gate the
effects of usury laws and restri ctions on creditor co llect ions other than exe mption s. A
furthe r study disentangling the e ffects of each of these restrictions would be useful.
18. That exe mpti on laws have a pronounced e lfect on debtors with few assets is
somewhat of a puzzle as these debtors can exempt all their assets in almost any reg ime.
For exarnpl e, Gropp, Scholz and White ( 1997) find a significant reducti on in the access
to credit for debtors with assets of less than $7,885 when the exemption s move from the
merely large (exemptions between $25,400 and $70,400) to the unlimited exemption s.
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assets when he is least well off. As noted, they may also prevent socially
wasteful debt collection practices . But a defense of these laws has two
predicates, both of them difficult to establi sh. First, the law should restrict
remedies only if a market fa ilure prevents creditor from supplying remedial term s that debtors wou ld be w illing to pay for and prevents the debtor
from using altern ative form of protecti on, such as credit insurance. t9 The
usual market failure arguments can be made, of course. Perhaps adverse
selection explain s why cred it con tracts rarely limit the creditor's remedial
ri ghts. But if the market has fail ed in thi s way, it is hard to understand
why there is s uch a robu st market in cred it ins urance.
Second, the defense ass umes that the law does reflect debtors' preferences. But the variation o f the law across states is too extreme to reflect
plausible differences in debtors' ri sk preferences. For example, an individual can exempt only a few thousand dollars worth of assets in Alabama
but a potentially unlimited amount of ho me equity in Florida. A study of
exemption law s in alISO states over a 22-year period reveals no correlation between the generos ity of exemptio ns and proxies for the demand for
in surance (Posner, Hynes, and Malani , 200 I).
The exemption s and the bankruptcy right to a di scharge may address
another concern, that of creating a class of peopl e who do not work
because they cannot keep their income or the assets they purchase with it;
thi s exp lanation is al so consistent with limitations on the ability of creditors to contact (and an noy) a debtor's empl oyer. Although cred itors and
debtors have incentives to renegotiate ex post, renegotiations will occasionally fail , because creditors want to maintain a reputat ion for toughness or hope to flu sh out debtors who have concealed their assets. The
hi story of debtors' pri son is ample ev idence. And as that hi story show s,
a class of peopl e immob ili zed or even imprisoned for debt sits uneasi ly
with mainstream political co mmitments in a democracy.
To the ex tent that debtors can waive exemptions and other limitations
on creditor remedies, these laws merely change the default rul e for collecti ons upon dehlult. Rather than contracting for protection through credit
in surance, nonrecourse loans, and other mean s, the debtor waives protections through security interests, cognovit notes, and the like. A comparison of the merits of the two de fault rules would require a deeper analysis
19. We acknow ledge th e crit ic isms o f thi s market, where profits appear to be unu suall y hi gh.
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of the preferences of debtors , the costs of contracting, the enforcement
of limitati ons on default planning, and other facto rs that are beyond the
scope o f this paper.
A number of studies try to deter mine if restrictions on creditor remedies provide a net bendit or a net cost. The authors reason that if the
restrictions are beneficia l, the increase in the interest rate demanded by
the cred itors should be more than offset by the increased willingness to
pay by the debtors. One should be able to verify thi s directly by separately estimating suppl y and demand or indirectl y by observing the total
quantity borrowed. The results of these studies are mixed . Barth, Cordes
and Yezer ( 1986) find that, although statutes limiting defic iency judgments
mi ght provide a net benefit, legal restrictions on confess ions of judgment
clauses, on garni shment, and on security interests in real property create a net cost. Villegas (1990) find that restri ctions on security interests
in personal property and o n wage garni shment prov ide a net benefit but
that prohibition s on wage assign ment create a net cost. Relatedly, Greer
(1974) and Peterson and F rew ( 1977) find that prohibitions against atto rneys' fees and garnishment reduce the total borrowings. Gropp, Scholz,
and White ( 1997) al so do not conduct an explicit compari son of the costs
and benefits of the exempti ons. However, they exa mine the etfect of the
exempti ons o n the total quantity of cred it and find that the exemptions
increase total borrowings by hi gh-asset debto rs but decrease total borrowing by low-asset debtors . There fore , following the logic of Villegas ( 1990),
larger exemptions seem to provide a net benefit for hi gh-asset debtors but
provide net costs for low-asset debtors. 2o
Although these results are interesting, the tests are imperfect. The comparisons assume that lenders and borrowers (or at least some borrowers)
are aware of the legal restrictions, can correctly predict their implications
at the time of borrowin g, and can adjust the contract in light of these
factors. T hi s assumpti on is questionable if the market failure justify in g
government interve nti on is that debtors underestimate the probability of
default or that debtors lack information about the consequences of default.
20. Sc hill ( 199 1) find s that the ri ght o r redempti on and Hilti de li c iancy judgment
rul e in the mortgage market ra ise mortgage interest rates by on ly a slnall amount and
argues that thi s cost may be outweighed by ot her benelits. He does not examine the
e ffec t of these rul es on access to cred it, however, and he does not empirica ll y evaluate
the benelits in add iti on to the costs .
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Moreover, even if debtors are fully informed , a finding that total credit
increases is not a necessary condition for determining that the laws are
beneficia l. Debtors may be willing to accept lower borrowing levels as a
price for increased insurance.2 1 In addition , involuntary creditors such as
tort claimants cannot adjust to the laws by charging a hi gh interest rate.
Finally, the limits on creditor remedies may playa role similar to those of
usury laws in discouraging high-risk loans undertaken as a result of the
moral hazard created by social welfare laws (.Tackson, 1985).

C. Bankruptcy
Description.

By tiling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the federal

bankruptcy code, a debtor can protect all hi s future income from his
cred itors, retain exempt property, preserve certain kinds of trust funds,
including pensions, even when they are not exempt under non bankruptcy
law, and delay the se izure of other assets through the automatic stay. A
large consumer bankruptcy literature addresses issues such as the role of
reaffirmations , the proper role of Chapter 13 , and the desirability of contractual bankruptcy but a review of thi s literature is beyond the scope of
this paper. 22 However, a brief overview of some of the empirical literature on bankruptcy is necessary for a proper understanding of the results
disc ussed in section B.

Eitec's.

Whi le several studies cited find that restnctlOns on creditor

remedies, including exemptions that apply in bankruptcy, affect the decision to borrow, there is li ttle evidence that these same restrictions affect
the decision whether or not to repay. This is surpri sing because debtors
in financial distress should be more aware of the law of collections than
debtors applying for a loan , particularly if they have retained an attorney. Likewise, creditors should not change their lending behaviors in
response to exemptions unless the exemptions have a real effect on their
expected 10sses.2J Unfortunately, good data on default and collections
2 1. For an example of thi s, see Append ix.
22. The law is frequent ly criticized for being too generous and intlexi ble. See, e.g.,
Adler, Po lak, and Schwartz (2000), Wang and White (2000), and White ( 1998a; I998b).
For a recent survey of the consumer bankruptcy literature, see Kowalewski (2000).
23. Of course credit rationin g could lead to fewer bankruptcies in finan cial distress
and th ereby daillpen any effect that larger exemption s have on repayment rates.
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are not available by state. 24 The available evidence, based on bankruptcy
data, suggests that exemption s do not significantly affect the filing rate
(see below) , and it is unlikely that exemption s substantially atrect repayment rates in bankruptcy, g ive n the minimal repayments that unsecured
creditors actually receive (White 1987).
Arguing that larger exemptions should make bankruptcy more attractive to debtors , many scholars have predicted that larger exemptions should
increase bankruptcy filin gs . While White (1987) finds a positive and statistically significant e ffect, the effect is small , and virtually all other publi shed studi es have found either no statistically significant effect or even
an etfect with the " wrong" sign. 25 Thi s result has been repeated in more
recent studi es that use panel data or quasi-experiments. 26
Because the literature was forced to compare the exemptions and the
bankruptcy filin g rate, its failure to find a strong positive correlation is
less surprising than it appears. The majority of exemptions available in
bankruptcy are also available to a debtor defaulting under state law and
therefore, though the exemptions should make default relatively more
att ractive than repayment, they do not necessarily make bankruptcy relatively more attractive than defaulting under state law. The many debtors
who have essentially zero assets file for bankruptcy in order to obtain
the di scharge: these people should not fil e in greater numbers when
exemptions increase. To establi sh a link between the exemptions and
the bankruptcy filing rate, one might be able to invoke the lien waiver
powers in the Bankruptcy Code, or the incentive to avoid the complex
financial arrangements that must be undertaken by a debtor who funnel s
all income into nonexempt assets. These are some of the ways in which
24. Em pirical studies of the effect s of garni shment restrictions on the filin g rate
highlight the shortcomings of focusing on bankruptcy filings. These studies generally
tind that states with laws that are more restrict ive of the ability of a creditor to garnIsh
a debtor's wages have higher filing rates. See, for exampl e, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith
( 1978); Ellis (1998a), and Heck ( 198 1). Although thi s effect could be due to higher
repayment rates, it is more plausibl y due to the ability of defaulting debtors to protect
their future incomes without filin g fo r bankruptcy.
25. See, for example, Apilado, Dauten, and Smith ( 1978) (fi nding mi xed results
when testing for a link between exemptions and the filing rate before to the enactment
o f the Bankruptcy Reform Act o f 1978), PeterSon and Aoki ( 1984), and Shiers and
Williamson ( 1987) .
26. See Buckley and Brinig ( 1998), Weiss, Bhandari, and Robins (\996). But see
Pomyk ala ( 1997) and Hynes (1998), findin g significant positive effects.
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the di scharge and exempti ons are co mple ments, but they seem tenuous
(Hynes, 1998).
The failure to find a corre lati on between exempti on levels and
bankruptcy fi lings might also be due to an inappropri ate use of aggregate
data when testing a hypothes is abo ut individual behavior. 27 The exemptions may have little e ffect o n aggregate fil ing rates because they are
relatively generous co mpared to the assets of most Americans, and
the reduction in access to credit may mean that debtors in states with
large exempti ons are less li ke ly to e nd up in financial distress. 28 Although
current work ing papers use individua l-level data to examine the filing
deci sion , the ir results cannot read il y be interpreted as a test of the impact
of exem pti on levels. These papers test whether de btors respo nd to the
fi nancial incentives of bankruptcy more generall y, including the di scharge, rather than just the exe mption s, and there fo re examine the effect
o f the debtor's "benefit" from filin g. "Benefit" is de fin ed as the debt that
can be di scharged less any asse ts above the exemption that the debtor
wo uld lose by fi li ng (Chakravarty and Rhee, 1999; Fay, Hurst, and White,
1998). Even if the exemption s have no e ffect on the fi ling dec isio n, the
coefficient on " bene fit" may still be sig nificant because househo lds with
more de bt fi le in order to obtain the di scharge.
Several stud ies investigate whether the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
increased the fi ling rate and re lated actions. 29 That statute in stituted several re form s that could have made bankruptcy more att ract ive (Domowitz
and Eova ld i, 1993), and the bankruptcy fil ing rate increased markedly in
the years that foll owed. Us ing time series econometri cs techniques, scho lars have tri ed to di sentang le the effects o f thi s act from the sig nificant
27. Earl y sc ho la rs attributed thi s " failure" to poss ible simultane ity bias; leg islatu res
mi ght adopt small e r exempti o ns in respo nse to hi g her filin g rmes. Peterso n and Aok i
( 1984), Shi e rs a nci William son ( 1987). However, it is un c lear why thi s sa me bias would
not have a sig nifi cant e ffec t o n the slUdi es of the credit ma rke t. A lth ough we lack a
good ex planati on lo r a state's cho ice of exe mption s, o ne mi g ht be able to test thi s
theory by using hi stori cal exemption s as a n instrume nta l vari abl e .
28. It is poss ib lc to co ll ec t data o n loa ns made by le nding in stituti o ns in each state.
However, the im po rt ance of nation al le nde rs in the mo rtgage a nd c redi t card in d ustry
makes it unli ke ly that such a va ri ab le would be hi ghl y co rrelated w ith the de bt issued
by residents of eac h state.
29. Wh il e we will di sc uss those arti cles d iscuss ing the dec ision to fi le, the inte rested
reade r may wish to consult those artic les discuss ing the e ffect o f the act on the c ho ice
be twee n C hapte rs 7 and 13. See, for ex ampl e, Oomow irz and Sa rtain ( 1999a, I 999b) .
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macroeconomic effects of this time period. The majority of the early studies addressing this question did, in fact, estimate that the code played a
significant role in increasing the bankruptcy fi ling rate. 30 One difficulty
with this literature, however, is that it requires a controversial assumption regarding the treatment of married couples filing jointly, which was
not permitted before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Domowitz and
Eovaldi (1993) examine summary statistics presented in studies of actual
filings to determine a range of values for the proper adjustment to the
post-act filing rate. When they use the lowest value of thi s range, they
estimate that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 increased the filing
rate by 22%. However, this estimate is not statistically significant; one
does not find a statistically significant result until one uses a value near
the upper end of this range. One solution to the problem highlighted by
Domowitz and Eova ldi (1993) would be to measure the effect on defaults
(as measured by loans charged off by banks) rather than bankruptcies.
Another difficulty with examining the effect of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 is that there were three other major legal changes that
occurred at about the same ti me. In 1977 the Supreme Court ruled that
restrictions on advertisements by lawyers are an unconstitutional restriction of free speech, thus increasing the spread of information about the
advantages of filing for bankruptcy (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona). ]n
1978 the Supreme Court ruled that the interest rate paid by a borrower
on a loan from an out-of-state bank would be governed by the usury ceiling of the state in which that bank was located (Marquette Nat'l Balik
of Minneapolis v. First of Or/"laha Servo Corp.). This reduced the abili ty
of a state to set effective interest rate ceilings and increased the number
of high-interest, high-ri sk loans. 3 1 Both of these events could have stimulated bankruptcy filings independent of the effect of the 1978 Act. Finally,
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was passed in 1977. Although
thi s act may have increased the default rate, it should have decreased the
bankruptcy rate by enhancing the ability of debtors to avoid repayment
without filing for bankruptcy. The fact that the Fair Debt Collection Prac30. See, for ex ample, Boyes and Faith ( 1986), Peterson and Aoki ( 1984), and
Shepard ( 1984). But see Bhandari and Weiss ( 1993).
3 1. Ell is ( 1998b) does di scuss the relative impOrlance of interest rate ce ilings and
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. However, if one uses state usury rates before
1978, a more ri gorous allempt at di sentangling (he effects mi ght be possible.
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tices A~t may have had an effect on the bankruptcy rate that would have
conflicted with the presumed effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and
the other laws is yet another reason to examine the default rate rather
than the bankruptcy rate.
D. Third-Party Defenses
De~·cription.
When retailers sell products on credit, they frequently resell
the debt to a third-party creditor. After this sale the buyer is obligated to
make payments directly to the third-party creditor. Hi storically, this was
true even if the contract between the buyer and the retail seller was vulnerable to legal challenge. If, for example, the buyer purchases defective
goods from a subsequently judgment-proof seller, the buyer would not be
able to use the seller's breach as a defense against the third-party creditor's
claim for repayment of the loan and would have no remedy against the
originql seller. This outcome was compelled by the holder in due course
doctrine when the buyer signed a negotiable instrument, but it could easily be obtained contractually by adding a waiver-of-defense clause to a
nonnegotiable instrument. The usefulness of these doctrines for third-party
cred itors is now severely restricted by federal and state law (A lperin and
Chase, 1986).

Effects.

The division of labor between seller and third-party creditor

clearly has advantages. Each party can specialize in developing experti se in its own market. The third-party doctrines also enhance the ability
of creditors to reduce region- or seller-specific ri sk by reselling the debt,
sometimes in large pools as "securitized" assets. The existence of these
advantages is supported by studies showing a reduction in the ability of
retailers to obtain financing and in the ability of consumers to obtain credit
in jurisdictions that were the first to ban the third-party doctrines (Rohner,
1975).
Opponents of the holder in due course and negotiability doctrines argue
that the deep-pocketed financier can more cheaply bear the risk of breach
by the seller than the buyer can and, further, that it can more cheaply
monitor sellers and prevent them from breaching in the first place. When
financiers have a continuing relationship with the seller, these conditions
might be met. But if these conditions are met and the market is competitive, then all three parties will voluntarily place the risk on the financier.

The L aw and Economi cs of Consumer Fi nance

193

It is not necessary fo r the law to prohibit the parties from choosing alter-

native re lati o nships, and indeed such a prohibi tion would reduce social
welfa re.
The r~gulat i o n s appear to be based on the assumption that the market fa il s, perhaps because o f pervasive consumer ignorance, and that
the regul atio ns compe l the outcome that the parties would want. Thi s
argument ass umes that consumers irrati onall y fail to update their beliefs
about c redit practices, even though they appear to do so in cash sale
contexts, where sell ers suppl y warranties (for example) in order to
attract buyers. Although thi s is poss ible, it seems just as li kely that consumers take advantage o f the cost sav ings permitted by specialization and
di versifi cati on.

E. Info rmati on Di sclos ure
Des(."ription.

T he Truth in Lending Act and related state and federal laws

require creditors to provide credit info rm ati on in a clear and consistent
way. T hese laws appl y not just to the credi t contract itself, but to all communi cations, such as advertisements, bill s, res ponses to billing inquiries,
and credit reports. Although the Truth in Lending Act and the associated
regu lations are compl ex and impose a number of obligations on credi tors, we w ill di scuss two of the primary elements o f this act.

32

First, this

law requires lenders to clearl y present the "amoun t fi nanced," " fin ance
charges," and " annual percentage rate" as calculated in a standardi zed
manner. Second, the law requires that creditors taking a security interest
in the debtor's ho me provide an expli cit di sclosure of such security interest and the debtor's ri ght to rescind the contract within three days (thi s
right may be extended to three yem's if certai n di sclosure requirements are
not met). The Truth in Lending Act provides for enforcement both by regulato ry age nc ies and by borrowers who are given a pri vate right of acti on
(Alperin and C hase, 1986).

Effects.

The stated goals of the Truth in Lending Act are to increase

economic stability, to enhance the ability of consumers to shop for attractive loan term s, and to prevent inacc urate and unfair billing. The fi rst of
32. For example, the Tru th in Lending Act regulates the process of correctin g billin g
errors, the cred it card customer's li ab ility fo r un authori zed use of the ca rd , and so forth .
For reasons of space, we do not dea l with these and other restricti ons.
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these goals cannot be evaluated empirically and the last of these goals
is similar to the prevention of fraud and hence beyond the scope of thi s
paper. The second goal is largely consistent with the di scuss ion of information failure presented above. The standardized calculations required by
the act-the amount financed, the finance charge, and the interest rateare class ic examples of scoring systems and there is some evidence that
the Truth in Lending Act increased consumer awareness of the terms covered by the act, particularly the annual percentage rate (Mandell, L971;
Brandt and Day, 1974; Day and Brandt, 1973; Shay and Schrober 1973).
Unfortunately, there is also evidence that the beneficial effects of these
law s in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive loans may have
been limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers. (Brandt and Day, 1974;
Day and Brandt, 1973; Deutcher, 1973; Mandell, 1971 ; Shay and Schober,
1973 ; White and Munger, 1971). Moreover, a problem common to all scoring systems is that firms are driven to emphasize the measured attribute
at the expense of hard-to-measure attributes (Beales, Craswell, and Salop,
198 1a, 198 1b). If consumers focus disproportionately on the interest rate,
lenders have an incentive to compete over thi s term and provide less attractive collection terms or cut back on customer service. There is some evidence of this phenomenon : borrower awareness of terms not covered by
the Truth in Lending Act, such as the dollar amount of the finance charges,
actually fell after its passage (Brandt and Day, 1974).
The required di sclosure of the scores created by the Truth-in-Lending
Act is more controversial. These scores are brand specific information
and creditors should have sufficient incentive to disclose this information in order to gain a competitive advantage. Government regulation
may overcome a collective action problem if no single creditor would
have the incentive to invest the resources to establish a credible standard.
Although a period of mandatory di sclosure may be helpful in establishing
the government-sponsored scoring system (Beales, Craswell, and Salop,
1981 b), any further period of mandatory di sclosure would seem unnecessary because typical stories of collective action problems stemming from
brand-specific information are inapplicable. 33 Of course, we have noted
that creditors with market power may wish to conceal private information
33. Securiti es law, for exa mple, requires iss uers of securities to reveal a great deal
of fin anc ial and business information. A popular exp lan ation for thi s requirement is that
issuers fear that if they provided adeq uate inform ation to their investors thi s information
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in order to engage in price di scrimination , but no one has shown that the
act has affected the ability of such creditors to price discriminate, if in
fact there are such cred itors.
The requirement that cred itors provide special disclosure (accompanied by a ri ght o f rescission) bf any security interest taken in the home
is a better exampl e of mandated disclosure. Creditor obviously has no
incenti ve to inform Debtor of the legal consequences of a security interest and to di sc lose the ri ght of resc iss io n, and hi s competitors may have
in su tlic ient incenti ve to di sclose them as well , as di scussed. We note, however, that the traditional arg ument fo r mandated disclosure would seem to
encompass much broader di sc losure of the legal consequences of failing
to pay a debt than what is required by the act. ]f debtors do not know
about the effects of security interests, they are not li kely to know about
the ho lder in due course doctrine or the ri ght of redempti on. The difficu lty is that too much disclosure of techni cal information may overwhelm
debtors and cause them to ignore it (compare Beales, Craswe ll , and Salop,
198 1b).
Critics o f the Truth in Lending Act have focu sed their criti cism on the
di fficu lty of com pl yi ng with the law. In addition to the adm ini strative costs
of comp li ance, the Truth in Lending Act may have reduced the abili ty of
creditors to col lect on bad loans, since a determined debtor can almost
certainl y find so me fault with the disclosure by the creditor (Rubin , 1991).
Although there is limited survey ev idence that the difficulty in compli ance
has reduced creditors' willingness to adverti se and ri sk violation (A ngell ,
1971 ), we know of no studies assess ing the effect of thi s law on cred itors'
willingness to lend.

F. A ntidi sc riminati o n Laws
Description.

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids creditors to di s-

crim inate against applicants fo r home mortgage loa ns on the basis of
race, co lor, re li gion, sex, national origin, or handicap or family statu s.
T he Equa l C redi t Opportunity Act (ECOA) forbids them to di scriminate
agai nst app li cants for cred it generally on similar, though not identical
gro und s. The Home Mortgage Di sclos ure Act requires finan cial instiwould a lso be revea led to the ir co mpetitors, but all investors and issuers would be beller
a ll if adequate information were revea led (Mahoney, 200 I).
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tutions to report data on all of their applicants for home mortgages,
including the race of the applicant.
Perhaps the most significant antidi scrimination statute is, by its express
terms, not an antidiscrimination statute at all. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requires the appropriate federal banking regulators to
"encourage ... institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consi stent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions." However, the CRA was largely justified
on the grounds of perceived di scrimination and interpretations by regulatory agencies refer to the need to enhance credit availability for minority
groups (Hylton and Rougeau, 1996).
Effects. There is an extensive literature on the role of discrimination in
lending markets and a full review is beyond the scope of this paper. 34
There is clear ev idence of historical discrimination in lending markets,
often supported by overt government policy, but there is no consensus as
to whether di scrimination still plays a significant role in credit markets,
whether it plays a role in some credit markets like the mortgage market
but not others, and whether such di scrimination that exists is based on
animu s or the use of race as a stati stical proxy for credit risk (Hylton
and Rougeau, 1996, 1999; Swire, 1995).35 To understand the difficulty of
evaluating the laws against di scrimination , suppose that discrimination is
due to the use of proxies. On the one hand, a prohibition of the use of
statistical di scrimination may force creditors to expend resources to try to
di stinguish between debtors and may exacerbate asymmetric-information
problems. On the other hand, stati stical discrimination may cause minorities to underinvest in human capital and the development of a credit history, in anticipation of being denied credit on account of their race (Hylton
and Rougeau, 1996).

There have been few successful suits brought under either the FHA or
the ECOA (Sw ire, 1995), and therefore there has not been much academic
debate concerning these laws . By contrast, the CRA has been controversial: many have argued that it is costly and ineffective. The CRA gener34. Good surveys ca n be fo und in Hylton and Rougeau ( 1996) and Swi re ( 1995).
35. Partly because of the data generated by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
emp irical studies of discriminatory lendin g foclls on the mortgage market rather than
other segments of th e credit market.
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ates significant compliance costs only for those banks that have branches
in low-income areas and thus may discourage large banks from serving
low-income areas (Macey and Miller, 1995) and discourage the development of small banks to serve low-income debtors (Hylton and Rougeau,
1999). Hylton and Rougeau ( 1996, 1999) argue that the current enforcement approach encourages hollow compliance in the form of loans to
wealthy developers operating in low- income neighborhoods or agreements
designed solely to appease politicians and political activists, and rentseeking behavior by politicians, interest groups, and even rival banks trying to block bank mergers. Finally, Sch ill and Wachter ( 1995) argue that
by targeting the location of the investment the CRA and related laws may
encourage concentration of poverty in urban areas.
In the end, there are plausible arguments for and against the CRA and
its effects remain poorly understood . Commentators agree that the CRA '
needs substantial reform , but they disagree strongly as to the direction thi s
reform should take with some calling for safe hm'bor provisions or a switch
to a subsidy system and others call ing for more vigorous enforcement.

4. Conclusion
Regulation of the market for consumer credit provides a number of
benefits to consumers. It gives them information about the terms and consequences of the credit transaction, it provides them insurance against
shocks, and it protects them from di scrimination. But a proper defense of
consumer credit regulation must explain why the market would not supply
these benefits if consumers are willing to pay for them . The availability
of credit in surance, the many ways in which typical credit transaction s
trade orf between interest rate and ri sk, and the existence of information
intermediaries all suggest that the market does respond to some degree to
consumer demand for credit protections.
Models that incorporate information asymmetry and market power have
ambiguous implications for consumer credit regulation . Information problems do prevent markets from achieving the first best, and laws regulating
the credit market can in theory increase social welfare. But it is difficult to
determine whether the premises of the models are met in reality. Compli cating the analy sis, the sensitivity of consumers and creditors to the law,
whether because of irrationality or rational ignorance, is unclear. And it
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is not clear how much the law wou ld inftuence the behavior of even a
rational, well-informed consumer, given the many loopholes, the limited
penalty structures, and the many way s in which creditors can evade the
law and creditors and debtors can contract around it.

Appendix
Thi s appendix sets forth a simpl e example of how a law that so lves a
failure of the credit market could, in theory, result in a decline in total
borrowing.
Assume that there is a debtor with per-period utility UO where U I > 0
and U" < 0 and a creditor that is ri sk neutral. Assume that the debtor
makes a take-it-or- leave-it offer to the creditor to borrow some amount

B. Ass ume further that the debtor has no first-period income and will
have a second-period income of L with probability p and a second-period
income of H with probability (I - p) . Assume that the debtor defaults if
and only if second-period income equals L (the marginal do ll ar borrowed
does not affect the probability of default) and that he is entitled to retain
an amount E in default. Finally, in order to make the examp le as simple
as possibl e, assume that neither the creditor nor the debtor discount future
va lues .
The cred itor mu st charge an interest rate (R) such that

B = ( I - p)(BR)

+ peL -

E) ,

B - peL - E)
( I - p)B

or R = - - ' - - ' - - -

(I)

The debtor will therefore maximize

U(B)

+ (I

U(B)

- p)U(H - BR)

+ pUCE),

+ pUce) + (I

_

p)u( H _ (B -(~)~L p) E))).

_

(B -(Ipel- p)- E»)) .

or
(2)

Or, the debtor wi ll set

UI(B)

= UI(H

(3)

In this very simple example, the amount borrowed is always decreasing
in the exemption. The reason is that the debtor seeks two things : lowcost credit, and in surance. The lower exemption- which in thi s example
is set by contract rather than by statute- reduces the cost of credit but
a lso reduces the amount of insurance. [I' the latter etlect dominates (as in
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thi s ex ampl e), an optimal exe mption results in less bargaining tha n a less
gene rous exemption . Thi s e xample is deliberately contrived; it assumes
tha t the pro bability of default is inde pe ndent of the amount borrowed and
on ly cons iders how the exemption s affect bOll'owing through a change in
the inte rest rate . If a debtor is re luctant to borrow a certain amount becau se
he may e nd up in a very painful de fault, the exemptions could increase
borrowing by lesse ning that fear. Thi s effect is not present here because a
marg inal change in borrowing has no effect on the probabi li ty of default
and never reduces consumption when the marginal utility of consumption
is hig he r than it is in period one . A more general model would show that
if both factors are con side red , an inc rease in total borrowing is sufficie nt
to show that a law is effi c ie nt but is not necessary.
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